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Students protest for freedom of speech outside the Supreme Court in Washington, D. C.
L__ 7 he Supreme Court's decision
in Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
_J pendent Community School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), did for
the ideal of freedom in America's pub-
lic schools what Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), did for
the ideal of equality. It made a core
value of the Bill of Rights spring to
life for young people facing unjust
policies and authoritarian treatment at
the hands of adult officials in local
school systems.
In his remarkable opinion for the
majority, Justice Abe Fortas upheld
thirteen-year-old Mary Beth Tinker's
First Amendment right to wear a black
antiwar armband to school by declar-
ing censorship of student expression
invalid unless a school can demon-
strate that it causes "material disrup-
tion" of the educational process. To be
sure, this powerful libertarian doctrine
has been eroded (much like the egali-
tarian vision of Brown) by the sharp
undertow of the Burger, Rehnquist,
and Roberts Courts, but it still shines
imperishably bright from the last cen-
tury as a beacon not only for student
rights but for constitutional democracy
in public settings generally. It express-
es the idea that every social institution
must respect freedom of speech unless
the exercise of that freedom would
thwart the very purpose of having the
institution in the first place.
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For a justice who served only four
years on the Court, Fortas struck a his-
toric blow for freedom in public
schools, but he did not write on an
empty blackboard. Even before Tinker
gave students the right to speak their
conscience, West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), had given them the right not to
have to speak against conscience.
The Barnette children were Jeho-
vah's Witnesses who refused for reli-
gious reasons to pledge allegiance to
the flag at school. It took unknown
courage for them to sit it out in small
town West Virginia in the middle of
World War II. The Supreme Court in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 586 (1940), had recently re-
jected a First Amendment attack on the
pledge salute, and Witnesses across
the country were facing official
reprisals and vigilante harassment for
their refusal to join in.
But Justice Robert Jackson came to
their aid, writing the Supreme Court's
first great student rights decision. "We
set up government by consent of the
governed," he wrote, "and the Bill of
Rights denies those in power any legal
opportunity to coerce that consent.
Authority here is to be controlled by
public opinion, not public opinion by
authority." 319 U.S. at 641. Then came
these immortal words: "If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constel-
lation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be or-
thodox in politics, nationalism, reli-
gion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein." Id. at 642.
Yet as great as Barnette was, it was
Tinker that proclaimed the right of
America's children to speak out at
school. After all, the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses were religionists minding their
own business, who wanted only to be
left alone. But angelic-looking Mary
Beth Tinker was an outspoken Ameri-
can rebel from the heartland, a preco-
cious free spirit challenging, in
wartime no less, the authority of the
president, the military-industrial com-
plex, and her school principal, who
had gotten wind of her protest and
hastily promulgated a rule banning
black armbands. But Mary Beth,
joined by her brother John and their
friend Chris Eckhardt, insisted on ex-
pressing solidarity for Senator Robert




Vietnam. Defiant, she wore her black
armband to school on December 16,
1965, making it to third period before
she was sent down the hall. She re-
fused to remove it and was suspended.
Her family received death threats and
had red paint splashed on their front
door. But the Tinkers hung tough and,
with the American Civil Liberties
Union, took their case all the way to
the Supreme Court.
At stake in Tinker, according to the
school district, was nothing less than
every school principal's power to
maintain order against the anarchy
threatened by children having political
speech rights at school.
But Fortas rejected arguments that
students have no First Amendment
rights. "It can hardly be argued," he
wrote, "that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." 393 U.S. at 506.
In tracing the contours of this free-
dom, Fortas found that schools can
never censor out of a "mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasant-
ness that always accompany an unpop-
ular viewpoint." Id. at 509. Rather, a
school seeking to censor must show
that a student's speech will "materially
and substantially interfere with the re-
quirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school," id., which
means "material[ ] disrupt[ion] of
classwork, substantial disorder or inva-
sion of the rights of others." Id. at 513.
Needless to say, Mary Beth's princi-
pal asserted that her black armband
was "disruptive." But Fortas found
that, under the First Amendment,
schools may not equate dissent with
disruption. "In our system," he wrote,
"state-operated schools may not be en-
claves of totalitarianism," and "stu-
dents may not be regarded as close-cir-
cuited recipients of only that which the
state chooses to communicate. They
may not be confined to the expression
of views that are officially approved.
Id. at 511. Rather, a school must have a
compelling reason for silencing stu-
dents, and "undifferentiated fear or ap-
prehension of disturbance" can never
be "enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression." Id. at 508.
The Court's sweeping analysis ad-
vanced not only a theory of democratic
rights but a democratic theory of educa-
tion. Mary Beth was not to be the
"close-circuited" recipient of informa-
tion drilled into her mind by the school
board. As a student, she must be an ac-
tive participant in the learning process.
Each student has something precious to
offer the rest of the class and "intercom-
munication among the students" is not
only "inevitable" but "an important part
of the educational process." Indeed, the
free exchange of thoughts and feelings
among students "is not confined to the
supervised and ordained discussion
which takes place in the classroom" but
spills over to the whole school day, in-
cluding athletic, extracurricular, and in-
formal events. Id. at 512.
This rendering of school in a
democracy closely resembles the
thinking of John Dewey, who argued
that students learn equally from the
"formal" curriculum and the "infor-
mal" curriculum generated in the in-
terstices of the school days, where
banter, jokes, talk of current events,
laughter, gossip, interaction with
teachers, and the full play of social life
acquaint students with cultural values
and political ideas.
Far from disrupting the educational
process, Mary Beth's silent protest en-
riched it. A good teacher would simply
have noted the armband and moved on
or picked up on it to teach about every-
thing from war powers to post-World
War II American foreign policy to free
speech itself. But there was surely no
reason to fear it because there is no
reason to fear blurring the boundaries
between school and the outside world.
The boundaries are porous and, as
Dewey put it, "learning in school
should be continuous with that out of
school." JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY
AND EDUCATION 410 (1916). Rather
than punishing Mary Beth's activism,
the school ought to have welcomed it.
Her principal lacked the proper sense
of democratic improvisation in the
learning process.
In following decades, the spirit of
Tinker helped move the Court to forbid
the removal of books from school li-
braries for political reasons (Board of
Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982)) and to protect the free speech
rights of religious groups obtaining
equal access to school facilities after
hours (Good News Club v. Milford
Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001)). It
also began to shift attitudes about stu-
dent speech in lower courts and many
school systems and prompted some
states, like Massachusetts, to codify
the Tinker standard in state law.
But the Court's hard turn to the
right over the years caused it to reverse
course in significant ways. It has
carved out meaty exceptions to the
Tinker rule, authorizing school censor-
ship in the case of "lewd and indecent"
student speech (Bethel School District
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)), in the
context of any "school-sponsored" stu-
dent speech in newspapers, yearbooks,
assemblies, theater productions, and
other outlets that "the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the impri-
matur of the school" (Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 271 (1988)), and most recently in
the case of student speech that might
be "reasonably viewed as promoting
illegal drug use" (Morse v. Frederick,
127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007)).
The reasoning of the majority deci-
sions in these cases is embarrassingly
humanycjh o
As great as Barnette was, it was Tinker that
proclaimed the right of America's children to
speak out at school.
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literal-minded. In Fraser, the Court
drew up the lewd and indecent speech
exception to uphold suspension and
other discipline of a mischievous stu-
dent at Bethel High School in Pierce
County, Washington, who gave a nom-
inating speech for a fellow student
running for student government based
on-surprise, surprise!-a sophomor-
ic sexual metaphor. He said, "I know a
man who is firm-he's firm in his
pants, he's firm in his shirt, his charac-
ter is firm," etc.
Surely the teacher supervising might
have rolled his or her eyes and spoken
disapprovingly of wasting the opportu-
nity on such a vacuous statement. But
suspension-for what? Are not Shake-
speare's plays-The Taming of the
Shrew and Twelfth Night come quickly
to mind-filled with sexual metaphors,
sneaky double entendres, and bawdy in-
sinuations? Of course, the teenaged cul-
prit was not Shakespeare, but surely a
nimble principal could have told Fraser
publically to channel his rudimentary
comic instincts into literature rather
than politics, where such speeches do
not fare very well. This would have
been a fair, stem, and educationally
meaningful intervention.
But the principal ordered, and the
Court affirmed, Fraser's suspension
and other punishment. If the Court had
to go in that direction, Justice William
Brennan, in his concurring opinion,
offered the right way to justify it.
There was no reason to carve out a
separate category for lewd and inde-
cent speech, he argued, since Fraser's
speech had actually "substantially dis-
rupted" the school's pedagogical mis-
sion to teach mature public advocacy.
Tinker should have been applied, not
shoved aside.
All in all, the Fraser case is not too
big a deal, but heavy frontal damage
was inflicted on Tinker in Hazelwood.
There, Principal Robert Reynolds cen-
sored two articles written by students
for their school newspaper and ap-
proved by the teacher of the journalism
class. One article concerned the impact
of parental divorce on students and the
other was about the problem of teen
pregnancy as seen through the experi-
ences of three pregnant students. Under
Tinker and Fraser, the articles were
plainly protected speech and neither
disruptive nor lewd or indecent. In-
deed, they were written in a mature and
thoughtful way about serious problems
much on the minds of the student body.
But the principal thought that the dis-
cussions of sex and birth control in the
latter story were "inappropriate for
some of the younger students" and that
the former story was unbalanced and
might invite controversy.
Even when Tinker




and its spirit was
often honored in
the breach.
The Court majority found that,
while Tinker governs the voluntary in-
dependent speech of students, greater
latitude must be granted to educators
to exercise "editorial control over the
style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities
as long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns." 484 U.S. at 273. It promptly
found Reynold's censorship of the
newspaper articles reasonable and not
based on viewpoint discrimination.
This decision prepares young journal-
ists to be not only edited by editors but
squelched by puritans in power.
The dissenting justices-William
Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and
Harry Blackmun-rallied around the
forsaken virtues of Tinker, observing
that the school's journalism class had
itself committed to publishing all arti-
cles that do not "materially and sub-
stantially interfere with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline." Id. at
278. It is indeed interesting to note
how many schools after Tinker quickly
embraced its intuitive free speech for-
mula.) The dissenters insisted that
mere political disagreement between
students and administration should
never be sufficient grounds for censor-
ing speech in a school publication.
After all, principals do not own their
schools and school publications be-
long to the school community itself,
which is governed as a state actor by
the First Amendment.
Of course, educators can require
students to learn the contents of a
course, but this truism is "the essence
of the Tinker test, not an excuse to
abandon it," as the dissenters insisted.
Id. at 283. They agreed that high
schools do not have to publish student
articles that are "ungrammatical, poor-
ly written, inadequately researched, bi-
ased or prejudiced," id., but pointed
out that "we need not abandon Tinker
to reach that conclusion, we need only
apply it." Id. at 283-84. What is crucial
is that school officials cannot act as
political "'thought police' stifling dis-
cussion of all but state-approved topics
and advocacy of all but the official po-
sition." Id. at 285. If the school found
fault with the articles about teen preg-
nancy and the meaning of divorce for
kids, it had every right simply to print
an institutional disclaimer or publish
opposing views.
After Hazelwood, the Court's 2007
decision in Frederick seems depress-
ingly predictable, as the Court again
exfoliated vast acres of free expression
to kill the mosquito of adolescent
humor. The student culprit in the case,
Joseph Frederick, was a high school
senior in Juneau, Alaska, who used the
occasion of the Olympic torch relay to
make a bid for national television cov-
erage by unfurling a banner bearing the
phrase "Bong Hits 4 Jesus." The major-
ity upheld his ten-day suspension
based on a new doctrine withdrawing
First Amendment protection from
speech advocating illegal drug use.
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It is tempting to dismiss the impor-
tance of a case based on such frivolous
facts, but Stevens's lucid and passion-
ate dissenting opinion points out the
dramatic change effected by the ma-
jority. The new exception to Tinker
discards the Court's prior commitment
to maintaining official viewpoint neu-
trality at school by approving "stark"
efforts to suppress one side of the na-
tional debate about drugs. Further-
more, the Court dropped Tinker's un-
derstanding that a censoring school
must show an imminent substantial
disruption. Frederick's "nonsense mes-
sage" posed no threat of any kind,
much less a threat of immediate sub-
stantial disruption. The likely effect of
his silly and surreal slogan was-noth-
ing at all. As Stevens memorably put
it: "Most students... do not shed their
brains at the schoolhouse gate, and
most students know dumb advocacy
when they see it." 127 S. Ct. at 2649.
The broader consequence, Stevens
observed, is a severe chill placed on stu-
dent speech questioning the war on
drugs. This is a chill we can ill afford,
he pointed out, as free debate was the
catalyst for changing the disastrous
policies of the Vietnam War and-even
more on point-Prohibition. Given the
mounting costs and casualties of drug
prohibition, Stevens warned against "si-
lencing opponents of the war on drugs;'
and stated that, in "the national debate
about a serious issue, it is the expres-
sion of the minority's viewpoint that
most demands the protection of the
First Amendment." Id. at 2651. Here
Stevens identified the freedom to dis-
sent at school with the freedom to dis-
sent in the society at large.
The various blows against Tinker
have led to accelerating censorship of
school newspapers, yearbooks, maga-
zines, and theatrical productions
around the country, as well as stepped
up discipline of students who inject
"inappropriate" language into the
school environment. Many administra-
tors now view themselves like (most)
private shopping mall owners, who get
to control who says what and when on
their premises. Of course, even when
Tinker was riding high, its sweeping
message did not penetrate all public
schools and its spirit was often hon-
ored in the breach. Constitutional liter-
acy exists at alarmingly low levels in
the country, and precious few students
know what their rights are, much less
how to fight for them or where to go
for help. (Despite Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962), Lee v. Wiseman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992), and other cases re-
jecting official prayer in school con-
texts, I still frequently meet students
who have been asked to pray together
at school, on the football field, or at
graduation.)
Yet Tinker is still good law. Its ene-
mies have managed to place it in a
straitjacket but failed to give it the
guillotine. Of course, there are still
those calling for its head. In his star-
tling concurring opinion in Morse,
Justice Clarence Thomas tried to re-
fute the idea that students have any
First Amendment rights at all and cited
approvingly cases from the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries in which
courts upheld severe discipline, in-
cluding corporal punishment, of stu-
dents for speaking against their mas-
ters, including a California appeals
decision affirming expulsion of a stu-
dent for criticizing unsafe conditions
at his school that added up to what he
saw as a significant fire hazard.
The irony, of course, is that while
Tinker-like Brown-stands as a tow-
ering symbol of constitutional ideals
rather than a complete statement of
how the world actually works, the rea-
soning of the case seems ever more vi-
sionary and relevant. All across the
country schools are struggling with the
proper treatment of student groups
protesting or supporting the Iraq war
and groups defending or opposing the
rights of lesbian-gay-bisexual-trans-
gender students. Moreover, the advent
of the Internet means that a whole new
generation of issues has grown up
around official efforts to punish off-
campus student speech on websites
that gossip about student life or dispar-
age school officials or teachers. In
these cases, which have not made it to
the Supreme Court yet, the lower
courts seem clear that the only speech
on students' private websites punish-
able by schools is that which threatens
actual harm to other members of the
community or otherwise substantially
disrupts the educational process. Tin-
ker thus not only makes school inter-
nally safe for democratic freedom but
provides the surest guidance to school
officials on how to proceed in disen-
tangling fair criticism and personal
opinion uttered off campus from those
true threats made to members of the
learning community.
Handled properly, the Internet age
could usher in a new birth of student
freedom of expression. Given that web-
sites are radically free and off limits to
official control in all but the most ex-
treme cases, shrewd officials might
think twice before using their handy
Hazelwood-Fraser-Morse powers at
school to censor student expression and
drive it off campus into the wild world
of cybertalk, where teachers have no
sway at all. It will benefit everyone if
educators resist the urge to censor and
instead engage students in serious intel-
lectual and political dialogue at school,
test their youthful dogmas and probe
their provisional certainties, tease out
their valuable and provocative insights,
and help them trim away that which is
unfair, sleazy, or irresponsible. This is
the path of true education, which is to
say the path of true freedom. It is a path
many schools have already chosen. It is
the path of Tinker.
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